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R1010dreams communicate a ‘hidden 
meaning’ disguised in symbolic 
language has become entrenched in 
popular folk psychology, there is scant 
empirical evidence to support this 
view. Grounded in the neurosciences, 
modern models of dreaming have 
instead focused on understanding the 
observable neural and psychological 
mechanisms that produce dream 
cognition. 
In direct opposition to 
psychoanalytic dream theory, Hobson 
and McCarley first presented their 
‘activation-synthesis’ hypothesis in 
1977, a highly influential neuroscientific 
account of dreaming that rejected 
the notion of dreams originating from 
a ‘meaning’ in need of deciphering. 
The key tenet of Hobson’s distinctly 
anti-Freudian theory was that dreams 
originate from neural signals in the 
brainstem generated during rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep. According 
to the activation-synthesis model, 
dreaming is experienced when the 
sleeping brain attempts to make some 
sense of this chaotic input into its 
higher-level cortical circuitry. Indeed, 
intermittent bursts of brainstem 
activity are a prominent feature of 
REM sleep, a phase during which 
dreaming is particularly likely to occur. 
Yet, since the late 1960s, it has been 
increasingly recognized that dreaming 
also occurs in the absence of REM, 
and is reported even from the deepest 
stages of ‘slow wave’ sleep. The clear 
presence of dreaming in non-rapid eye 
movement (NREM) sleep, sometimes 
as vivid, bizarre, and story-like as 
REM dreaming, presents a problem 
for models proposing REM-specific 
physiology as the exclusive origin of 
dream experience.
Most recently, developments 
in the cognitive neuroscience of 
memory have led to a new brain-
based framework for understanding 
dreaming, in which dream experience 
is viewed as one of several forms of 
spontaneous offline cognition involving 
the reactivation and processing of 
memory during resting states. There is 
now substantial empirical evidence to 
suggest that, during sleep, the neural-
level ‘replay’ of recent experience 
plays a critical role in the consolidation 
and evolution of memory, helping us 
to process our past experiences and 
prepare for future events. Here, we 
will review evidence that the activity 
of memory systems in the sleeping 
brain contributes to the conscious 
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The activities of the mind and brain 
never cease. Although many of our 
waking hours are spent processing 
sensory input and executing behavioral 
responses, moments of unoccupied 
rest free us to wander through 
thoughts of the past and future, create 
daydreams, and imagine fictitious 
scenarios. During sleep, when attention 
to sensory input is at a minimum, 
the mind continues to process 
information, using memory fragments 
to create the images, thoughts, 
and narratives that we commonly 
call ‘dreaming’. Far from being a 
random or meaningless distraction, 
spontaneous cognition during states 
of sleep and resting wakefulness 
appears to serve important functions 
related to processing past memories 
and planning for the future. From 
single-cell recordings in rodents to 
behavioral studies in humans, recent 
studies in the neurosciences suggest 
a new conception of dreaming as part 
of a continuum of adaptive cognitive 
processing occurring across the full 
range of mind/brain states.
Models of the dreaming process
Once regarded as messages from 
gods or portents of the future, 
supernatural explanations of dreaming 
had largely given way to psychological 
approaches by the late 19th century. 
Yet for many decades to come, 
concepts of dreaming continued to 
be dominated by the presumption 
that these seemingly bizarre nocturnal 
experiences originated in mechanisms 
disparate from those supporting 
normal waking cognition. With the 
publication of The Interpretation of 
Dreams in 1900, Freud famously 
popularized the notion that dream 
content cannot be taken at face 
value, instead originating in complex 
psychological mechanisms entirely 
dissimilar from those generating the 
thoughts, feelings, and reminiscences 
of our typical waking experience. 
Although the Freudian notion that 
Primerand so virtually every molecular tool required for genetics has been 
developed for use in this system, 
for example: gene knock-outs and 
knock-ins; insertional mutagenesis 
(REMI); cell-type-specific or 
inducible expression systems; 
replicative and integrative plasmids. 
Cell biological tools such as protein 
tagging, organelle markers, and 
immunostaining are also available. 
All strains generated can be easily 
frozen down in liquid nitrogen for 
long-term storage.
What resources are there? Since 
the completion of the genome in 
2005, it has become easy to search 
for gene homologues in Dicty. The 
genome is very simple to browse 
thanks to dictyBase, a website 
that provides access to all sorts 
of information from movies, to 
techniques, to mutant phenotypes, 
to gene expression data. The stock 
centre is another fantastic resource: 
a central repository where wild-type 
strains, mutants, cDNA libraries 
and constructs are maintained and 
available to order.
Anything else? Dicty is being used 
to study so much more than has been 
possible to mention here! Many other 
researchers have taken advantage 
of Dicty’s genetic tractability and 
conserved machinery to investigate 
other biological processes such as 
histone modification, DNA repair 
pathways, mitochondrial diseases 
and nuclear architecture.
Others are interested in Dicty biology 
itself and how Dictyosteliida do things 
such as sexual reproduction; how this 
is achieved in lower eukaryotes can 
tell us much about evolution of such 
fundamental processes.
Where can I find out more?
http://dictybase.org/
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R1011experience of ‘dreaming’, a mental 
state that shares many features with 
thought, imagery, and daydreaming 
during wakefulness. 
Offline reactivation of memory during 
sleep and quiet wakefulness
Recent work in the neuroscience 
of memory has been particularly 
enlightening for thinking about the 
neural basis of dream experience. 
Perhaps of greatest importance 
is evidence from divergent 
methodologies that describe the 
neural ‘reactivation’ of recent 
experiences during quiet wakefulness 
and sleep. Multi-unit recordings in 
animals have shown that sequences 
of network activity first seen when a 
rodent is exploring its environment 
are again reiterated when animals 
rest or fall asleep. First observed 
within the hippocampal memory 
system, this reactivation effect 
has now been demonstrated to 
simultaneously occur in several 
cortical areas as well. In sleep, 
memory reactivation has most 
often been observed during NREM 
sleep immediately after exploration/
learning, with the strength of 
the reactivation effect decaying 
substantially across the first hour of 
post-training rest. Analogous results 
have been obtained in humans, with 
imaging studies demonstrating that 
activity in brain regions engaged 
during a learning task is elevated 
during post-training sleep, relative 
to participants who did not engage 
in learning. This offline reactivation 
of newly acquired information is 
thought to play a role in stabilizing 
labile memory traces into a more 
permanent form of long-term storage, 
while integrating new experience 
into existing cortical knowledge 
structures (‘memory consolidation’). 
Is the so-called ‘replay’ of memory 
in the sleeping brain related to the 
conscious experience of dreaming? 
Recent evidence from a variety of 
sources suggests that the answer 
is ‘yes’. Particularly during early-
night NREM sleep — when memory 
reactivation in animals is at its 
strongest — dream content is very 
likely to reflect recent learning 
experiences. Work from our laboratory 
and others has experimentally 
demonstrated this ‘cognitive-level 
memory reactivation’ by observing the 
impact of highly engaging or emotional 
learning tasks on the content of 
thought and imagery in subsequent 
periods of sleep. The impact of such 
experiences on dream content is often 
dramatic: after extensively playing the 
downhill skiing arcade game Alpine 
Racer II, a third of participants’ sleep 
onset dreams contained task-related 
thought or imagery, for example “I keep 
seeing all the places where I fall — like, 
hit the walls. It’s kind of annoying; and 
then my legs fly up in the air”.
Non-experimental approaches also 
clearly indicate that recent experience 
is frequently represented in dreams. 
For example, in an analysis comparing 
hundreds of dream reports with 
possible memory sources from a diary 
of waking events, 51% of dreams 
contained at least one feature bearing 
strong, direct similarity to a recent 
waking experience. Interestingly, 
however, it was rare for a dream 
experience to exactly replicate any 
particular waking event, occurring in 
only about 2% of all reports. Instead, 
elements of a waking experience, 
perhaps a character or theme, are 
typically integrated into the dream, 
but without replicating the original 
context in which these elements were 
embedded. As an example, take the 
following dream report, presented 
together with a waking memory source:
Waking memory source: “When I left 
Starbucks [at the end of my shift], 
we had so many leftover pastries 
and muffins to throw away or take 
home. I couldn’t decide which 
muffins to take and which to toss…”
Corresponding dream report:  
“My dad and I leave to go shopping. 
We go from room to room, store to 
store. One of the stores is filled with 
muffins, muffins, muffins from floor 
to ceiling, all different kinds, I can’t 
decide which one I want…”
A substantial body of human 
behavioral data demonstrates that 
post-learning sleep actually enhances 
memory for newly learned information, 
relative to equivalent periods of 
wakefulness. Offline ‘reactivation’ of 
memory in the sleeping brain may be a 
critical aspect of this sleep-dependent 
memory processing. For example, 
systems-level memory reactivation 
in humans, as indexed by functional 
neuroimaging, predicts overnight 
memory enhancement observed at 
a subsequent retest. Furthermore, 
several experiments demonstrate that 
delivering learning-related sensory 
cues to sleeping subjects — for 
example, sounds or smells present 
during encoding — enhances later 
memory performance, presumably by 
inducing reactivation of the learning 
experience during sleep. 
Critically for our purposes here, 
recent work in our laboratory has 
established cognitive-level reactivation 
of memory traces as a predictor 
of sleep-dependent performance 
enhancement, thus linking sleep-
dependent memory processing to 
human dreaming. Following training 
on a virtual maze navigation task, 
participants either lay down for a  
90-minute nap, or else remained awake. 
As expected, post-learning sleep 
enhanced navigation performance. But 
in addition to measuring performance, 
memory reactivation was indexed by 
collecting verbal reports of participants’ 
mental experience during the nap, and 
examining these reports for content 
directly related to the maze task 
performed just prior to sleep. Those 
participants reporting task-related 
dreams exhibited strongly enhanced 
memory for the maze environment at 
subsequent retest. 
Taken together, these findings 
suggest that dream experience is a 
reflection of mnemonic processes 
in the sleeping brain. But we are 
not suggesting that mechanisms 
of memory consolidation alone 
can provide a complete account of 
mental experience in any state of 
consciousness. Nor do we propose 
that dreaming of a learning task 
causes improved memory. More likely 
is a scenario in which neural-level 
mechanisms of memory reactivation 
support sleep-dependent memory 
consolidation and performance 
improvement, while simultaneously 
contributing to dream construction. It 
is worth noting that the type of memory 
reactivation described in rodent models 
cannot be the only neural mechanism 
involved in dreaming, as individual 
‘reactivation’ events seen during NREM 
sleep occur on a very fast timescale, 
during bursts of activity which last only 
a fraction of a second. In contrast, 
dream scenarios may focus on a single 
mnemonic theme for extended periods 
of time. Thus, it is most realistic to 
view memory reactivation as one of 
possibly many contributors to the 
dream construction process. As in our 
waking hours, the complex nature of 
mental experience during sleep is the 
product of an active cortex continuing 
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of reduced sensory input, as the brain 
engages in a variety of offline cognitive 
processes. Indeed, we will conclude 
this primer by describing how the study 
of offline forms of cognition across 
states of consciousness may serve to 
further elucidate both the neural basis 
of dream experience, and the nature  
of waking cognition.
The ‘default’ mode of brain function 
Traditionally, cognitive neuroscience 
has focused on understanding the 
activities of the mind and brain in 
response to external inputs. However, 
recent years have brought renewed 
attention to the importance of 
spontaneous brain activity occurring 
during periods of rest, sleep, and other 
offline states, when the processing of 
sensory input is reduced to a minimum. 
Research on the ‘default’ mode of brain 
function, in particular, has fruitfully 
explored the role that resting brain 
states may play in the processing of 
new memories, in theory of mind, and in 
anticipation of the future. Attention was 
first drawn to default-network activity 
in the 1990s, when imaging researchers 
noticed a consistent network of brain 
regions in which activity increased 
during baseline resting conditions, and 
decreased when subjects attended to 
an experimental task. This network of 
rest-active areas — including medial 
temporal, medial prefrontal, midline, 
and parietal regions (reviewed in 
Buckner et al. 2008) — has reminded 
the neuroscience community that in 
rest, as in sleep, the brain continues to 
process information and to generate 
conscious experience. 
Default mode brain function shares 
features with sleep and dreaming 
which suggest resting wakefulness 
as a practical model for investigating 
neurophysiological relationships 
between memory systems and 
subjective experience across states 
of consciousness. Fundamentally, 
resting wakefulness and sleep share 
a dramatically reduced attention to 
sensory input. In sleep, inhibition at 
the level of the thalamus dramatically 
increases sensory thresholds and 
effectively blocks input from the 
outside world — this inhibition has 
long been thought to facilitate the 
emergence of dream imagery. In 
waking rest, we likewise turn our 
attention away from the environment 
and towards internally generated 
thought and imagery. During 
wakefulness, the prevalence of 
daydream-like ‘stimulus-independent 
thought’ varies reciprocally with 
sensory demands, increasing with 
interstimulus interval in signal 
detection tasks. 
Most recently, Buckner et al. (2008) 
have reported that default network 
activity is enhanced under conditions 
of reduced sensory monitoring that 
increase the incidence of stimulus-
independent thought. Furthermore, 
individuals reporting more task-
irrelevant thoughts of the past and 
future during a resting condition 
exhibited increased functional 
connectivity between medial temporal 
lobe structures and other components 
of the default network. In pathological 
conditions as well, reduction of 
sensory input produces imagery and 
hallucination — for example, in Charles 
Bonnet syndrome or during periods 
of extended visual deprivation. Thus, 
reduction of sensory processing 
alone may partially account for the 
emergence of spontaneous mental 
experience during both resting 
wakefulness and sleep, with the 
generation of this mentation in both of 
these states being related to activity in 
default-network structures.
The content of thought and imagery 
during resting wakefulness also 
shares many features with dream 
experience. Although reports of 
daydreaming are typically shorter 
and less fantastical than REM-stage 
dreaming, at times these experiences 
can be highly visually vivid and 
bizarre. Conversely, dream reports 
from early-night sleep often consist 
of unremarkable reminiscences 
and musings indistinguishable from 
waking thought. More specifically, 
both waking daydreams and nocturnal 
dream experiences contain a mélange 
of fragments from recent and remote 
episodic memory. Thus, far from being 
an obscure symbolic language in 
need of interpretation, both waking 
thoughts and dream experiences are 
transparently centered on people, 
activities, and ideas experienced  
in daily life. 
Of course, not all dreaming 
can be characterized as a simple 
recombination of discrete waking 
events — spontaneous cognition in 
both sleep and waking synthesizes 
novel content by interleaving memory 
elements with related concepts, 
images, emotions, and themes. The 
resulting experiences are replete 
with objects, events, and narratives 
never encountered in waking life. 
During wakefulness, this process 
of constructing novel scenes and 
scenarios from mnemonic content has 
been studied in the context of ‘future 
projection’, scene construction, and 
the generally ‘constructive’ nature of 
memory.
The default mode brain state also 
shows striking neurophysiological 
similarities with sleep. The pattern of 
regional brain activation that defines 
the ‘default mode’ during resting 
wakefulness overlaps substantially 
with patterns of preserved brain 
activity identified in imaging studies 
of sleep. Perhaps most notably for 
our purposes here, regional activity in 
memory-related areas of the medial 
prefrontal cortex and medial temporal 
lobe is relatively preserved throughout 
all stages of sleep, even in the face 
of dramatically decreased overall 
cerebral blood flow during NREM 
stages. These same areas are critical 
components of the resting state default 
network. Certainly, patterns of brain 
activation are not identical during quiet 
wakefulness and sleep — for  
example, some parietal regions 
identified as key components of 
the default network show distinct 
deactivation during sleep.
There are neurochemical similarities 
too. During early-night NREM sleep —  
when neural-level reactivation of 
memory is prominent in rodents and 
when ‘cognitive-level replay’ of recent 
learning experience is particularly 
evident in dreaming — acetylcholine 
levels are at a minimum. Similarly, 
during quiet wakefulness, acetylcholine 
is reduced to about 60% of active 
waking levels. The decreased 
acetylcholine levels characteristic of 
these states are thought to promote 
the consolidation phase of episodic 
memory by supporting information 
flow from the hippocampus out 
through the entorhinal cortex. Note, 
however, that decreased acetylcholine 
cannot be taken as a precondition 
for the emergence of spontaneous 
offline cognition, as acetylcholine 
levels during REM sleep dreaming 
actually exceed those in wakefulness. 
Different neurochemical conditions in 
REM sleep versus NREM and quiet 
waking may support different forms of 
memory processing in these states. 
Indeed, REM and NREM sleep have 
been implicated in the consolidation of 
different forms of memory, while REM 
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tend to incorporate different  
types of memory source. 
Finally, during both quiet 
wakefulness and NREM sleep, the 
medial temporal electroencephalogram 
(EEG) is characterized by hippocampal 
‘sharp-wave ripple’ events, brief  
(~100 ms) population bursts 
associated with high-frequency (>100 
Hz) ‘ripple’ oscillations. In sleep 
and waking rest, the reactivation of 
memory traces in rodents occurs 
during these sharp-wave ripple events. 
These electrophysiological events 
are thought to support hippocampal-
cortical communication involved 
in consolidation of memory. Taken 
together, these observations indicate 
that memory-related activity — which 
represents a prominent feature of the 
default state — is relatively preserved 
during sleep (at least during NREM), 
further suggesting that mnemonic 
processing contributes similarly  
to the generation of dreams during 
sleep, and daydreams during  
relaxed wakefulness.
Although the functional significance 
of default-network activity remains 
a topic of debate, several proposed 
functions for resting brain activity 
overlap with those ascribed to 
sleep states. Most relevant for the 
present discussion is the notion 
that memory consolidation occurs 
during offline resting wakefulness, as 
well as during sleep. As mentioned 
above, it is well-established that 
sleep following learning leads to an 
enhancement of memory, relative 
to an equivalent period of active 
wakefulness. However, several recent 
studies indicate that, for certain types 
of learning task, a period of quiet 
wakefulness may also be beneficial 
for memory retention. Although 
there is scant evidence addressing 
the question of whether default-
network activity is involved in memory 
consolidation, the strong activity of 
memory-related networks during 
the default state, in concert with the 
mnemonic contents of daydreaming, 
support such a hypothesis. 
Recently, default-mode brain activity 
has also been conceptualized as a 
vehicle for ‘future-projection’, in which 
past experience is used to construct 
stimulations of possible future  
events. This description of cognition 
during the default state — in which  
fragments of past experience are 
recombined into novel scenarios —  
is formally identical to the description 
of the incorporation of memory 
fragments into dreams described 
above. Thus, default network brain 
activity appears to share meaningful 
features with the neurophysiology 
of sleep, and supports a form of 
mental experience similar to dreaming 
(‘daydreaming’), in which memory 
consolidation processes involving 
the reactivation and recombination 
of memory fragments contribute to 
the content of concomitant mental 
experience. 
In summary, research on the default 
mode suggests that we must abandon 
the entrenched view of dreaming 
as an unintelligible and mysterious 
phenomenon relying on entirely 
unknown brain processes and serving 
little or no function. Instead, dreaming 
is more accurately seen as part of a 
continuum of subjective experience 
spanning states of sleep and 
wakefulness, and serving mnemonic 
functions related to the evolution  
of memories, including both  
the consolidation of existing memory 
and the simulation of  
possible future events.
A new model of dreaming
Of course, it has been recognized 
for many decades that elements 
from recent and long-past memories 
form much of the content of dream 
experience. Indeed, analysis of 
dream content led several theorists 
to postulate a role for dreaming in 
processing past experience and 
planning for the future, prior to much 
of the neuroscientific evidence 
reviewed above. Current work on 
future projection during the default 
state echoes, for example, the work 
of Antti Revonsuo exploring dream 
cognition as a vehicle for ‘threat 
simulation’, in which emotionally laden 
scenarios are played out during sleep, 
in preparation for future experience. 
In studies dating back to the 1960s, 
dream researchers John Antrobus and 
David Foulkes proposed influential 
models of dreaming-as-cognition, 
which viewed subjective experience 
during sleep as an extension of, rather 
than a departure from, the activities 
of the brain during wakefulness. It is 
only recently, however, that empirical 
evidence to support a detailed brain-
based model of dreaming cognition 
has been available, with science now 
in a position to answer questions 
about the nature and function of 
dream experience that seemed 
intractable only a few decades earlier.
These observations lead us to a 
view of dreaming as of the product 
of a mind that is constantly encoding 
and processing information about 
the world. When sensory input 
is at a minimum, newly formed 
memory traces are stabilized during 
offline states of quiet wakefulness 
and sleep, through the repeated 
reactivation of experience-related 
activity patterns. During sleep, 
this reactivation of memory traces 
contributes to the imagery, thought, 
and narrative of dreaming. During 
wakefulness, memory reactivation and 
consolidation constitute one important 
function of the default network state, 
contributing to the thought and 
imagery characteristic  
of ‘daydreaming’.
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